CloudWalker FPV Traced to Shenzhen Xinshengbo Supplying Russian Military Drones

Executive Summary

ChinaCorpWatch has successfully traced cloudwalkerfpv.com an anonymous website selling military grade fiber-optic FPV drone components to its Chinese manufacturing source. The site openly markets 60km range fiber spools, the same extended range systems documented in Russian kamikaze drone operations in Ukraine.

Context: In August 2024, Reuters revealed that Russian military drones contained components from 30+ Chinese companies. Ukrainian defense officials report 60-70% of critical components in recovered Russian kamikaze drones originate from Chinese manufacturers. The U.S. Treasury has sanctioned multiple Chinese firms, yet the supply chain persists through intermediaries exploiting export control gaps.

---

Fiber-Optic FPV Technology: Military Advantages

Fiber-optic cables provide critical advantages over wireless systems in combat environments:

• Jam-proof: Cannot be blocked by electronic warfare
• Undetectable: No RF signature to intercept
• Extended range: 20-60km operational distance
• Low latency: Real-time control for precision strikes

Russian forces increasingly rely on fiber-optic FPV drones in areas where Ukrainian electronic warfare renders wireless systems ineffective. The extended range allows operators to remain far from front lines during strikes.

Environmental Impact: Thousands of kilometers of fiber-optic cable now contaminate Ukrainian battlefields. Unlike biodegradable materials, fiber-optic cables are non-degradable and nearly impossible to recover from conflict zones similar to plastic pollution, they persist in soil and water for decades. Reports confirm that Chinese and Russian companies have developed more durable military cables specifically designed for extended battlefield use, ensuring these materials will contaminate ecosystems long after the conflict ends. The cables' glass and polymer composition resists decomposition, creating permanent environmental hazards in agricultural land and water sources.

---

Investigation Findings

ChinaCorpWatch's investigation began with a critical observation: CloudWalker's marketing materials on social media platforms repeatedly featured distinctive fiber-optic winding machinery with yellow side panels. This same equipment appeared in a Russian procurement video showcasing fiber-optic drone systems destined for the Ukrainian front.

Chinese manufacturer's marketing material

---

Tracing the Corporate Network

The investigation began with CloudWalker's Facebook page, which listed Yunchuang Pilotage Co., Ltd. (云创领航有限公司) as the registered entity. Corporate records revealed this company was registered in early 2025 at:

Address: Shenzhen Longhua District, Minzhi Street, Minkang Community, 1970 Cultural Creative Park Building A, Room 609

At present, there is no publicly available information sufficient to determine whether this entity is involved in the sale of products listed on sanctions registers. Based on available records, the company appears more consistent with a nominal or shell entity, or a company name listed for identification purposes rather than as an operational seller.

---

After extensive searches on Alibaba’s 1688 platform for equipment featuring yellow-sided housings matching those observed in Russian procurement videos, we identified Shenzhen Xinshengbo Electronic Technology Co., Ltd. (深圳市新圣博电子科技有限公司).

Cross verification confirmed this as the manufacturing source through:

• Identical yellow-sided fiber-optic winding equipment
• Matching product specifications and imagery
• Factory floor layouts visible in promotional materials

Shenzhen Xinshengbo's 1688 storefront

Factory Marketing Page

Marketing materials showing factory equipment

---

Corporate Network Analysis: Shenzhen Xinshengbo's corporate filings revealed supervisor Wang Jiangfang (王将访), who also controls Shenzhen Neweggs International Trade Co., Ltd. (深圳纽艾格国际贸易有限公司).

Address: Shenzhen Longhua District, Minzhi Street, Minzhi Community, Minzhi Avenue 318, Jiaxi Business Plaza, Room 951

---

The Three-Layer Network: Geographic Clustering as Evidence

The two addresses are less than 5 minutes apart by car, revealing a coordinated operation hidden behind separate corporate entities:

The Corporate Structure:

1. Yunchuang Pilotage Co., Ltd. (云创领航有限公司)

   • Role: Storefront/registration entity for online sales
   • Address: 1970 Cultural Creative Park Building A, Room 609

2. Shenzhen Xinshengbo Electronic Technology Co., Ltd. (深圳市新圣博电子科技有限公司)

   • Role: Manufacturing facility producing fiber-optic systems
   • Connected via: Matching yellow-sided machinery and product specifications

3. Shenzhen Neweggs International Trade Co., Ltd. (深圳纽艾格国际贸易有限公司)

   • Role: Export operations and international logistics
   • Address: Jiaxi Business Plaza, Room 951

This structure mirrors classic export control evasion tactics: functional separation (manufacturing, sales, export divided across entities) maintained through operational control (shared personnel) and geographic proximity (coordination while appearing independent). The anonymous CloudWalker website shields the manufacturing source, allowing operations to continue through alternate entities when enforcement targets any single company.

The registration of Yunchuang Pilotage in early 2025 coinciding with increased sanctions pressure, suggests deliberate adaptation to regulatory scrutiny.

---

The CloudWalker investigation demonstrates how anonymous websites enable sanctioned trade to persist. Despite clear connections between:

• Military-grade components advertised online
• Manufacturing facilities in China
• Russian procurement networks

We call on international enforcement bodies to:

1. Sanction the complete corporate network: Yunchuang Pilotage, Xinshengbo Electronic, Neweggs International Trade, and Wang Jiangfang personally

2. Target enabling infrastructure:

   • Payment processors handling CloudWalker transactions
   • Web hosting providers for cloudwalkerfpv.com
   • Logistics companies shipping to Russian intermediaries

3. Close the "anonymous website" loophole: Require supplier verification before allowing military grade component listings

Every day these operations continue, the message remains clear: war profiteering through anonymous channels carries no consequences.